Coaching Non-Challenges, Bill Belichick Does It Again, and Mike Tomlin's Goal Line Call
By Jason Lisk
I know I talked about coaches making stupid challenges this year, but I think that the necessity of a challenge has to do with both the high leverage nature of the situation, and the likelihood of success, and then has to be evaluated based on how quickly the coach and his staff have to process the decision. After a turnover on the field (such as Chicago-Green Bay), for example, you have more time on the change of possession to see the evidence before the challenge. After an opponent touchdown (a high leverage play) you often have to make a decision before seeing several angles.
Lovie Smith: Lovie Smith pulled a double whammy, challenging a non-high leverage play and then refusing to use his last challenge the very next play as a result. Chicago had the ball on the Washington 1, where Smith had just challenged that the receiver was down by contact short of the end zone and lost (there is a difference between first and goal at the 1, and a touchdown, but you better be darn sure you are going to win if you are going to use a challenge there). The Bears led 14-10, and it was on the first drive of the second half. Jay Cutler extended the ball over the line of scrimmage and appeared to cross the plane of the goal, and then after he pulled the ball back, it was knocked loose and ruled a fumble on the field, with Washington recovering on the 1.
This is about as high leverage of a situation as you can have, swinging from 7 points to loss of possession in one play. As it involved change of possession, the staff should have had time to make this challenge. How low would the chances of success have to be to justify this challenge? I think that going up by 11 versus losing possession is worth a challenge even if you thought you had only about a 20% chance of them finding that the ball had crossed the plane. The video evidence suggests a challenge was way more likely to be successful than that. I could not have made up this sequence of challenges and non-challenges, but it should go in the 2011 coaching clinic video, filed under “Do Not Do This”.
Brad Childress: Aaron Rodgers threw a touchdown pass to Andrew Quarless in the back of the end zone, and it was questionable whether he got two limbs down before he hit out of bounds. This is one where there is not sufficient time to get a great angle before a challenge, but it is a high leverage situation. Because it is third down, a successful challenge takes a way a touchdown and results in a field goal attempt. It’s similar to the Lovie Smith in that I think you have to challenge if you think there is a 25% chance of success. As it turned out, not only was there a question of whether Quarless came down, but he also failed to maintain possession through the catch and bobbled it when he hit the ground on the back line. A challenge was likely to be successful (side note: I thought the overturn of the Shiancoe touchdown was incorrect).
Mike McCarthy: This one is a little harder, though I thought McCarthy should have challenged. Rodgers completed a pass to Greg Jennings on third down near the Minnesota 33, with about 12 minutes left and Green Bay up by 4. The ruling on the field was that Jennings was short of the first down, and it brought up 4th and 1. Replay immediately after the play appeared to show Jennings making the catch beyond the first down line and then being pushed back by the defender and tackled behind the first down line. A challenge was, in my opinion, highly likely to be successful. The issue was that McCarthy was down to his last challenge.
It was not as high a leverage situation (4th and 1, which they could still go for and convert), but having a first down inside the Minnesota 35 there with 12 minutes left would have increased the likelihood of winning for the Packers. I thought the chances of success were high enough to use the last challenge and guarantee that very good situation. The saying “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush” is applicable here. I know it would be scary to have no challenges left, but I think you use it when the opportunity presents here, playing with the lead and on the verge of increasing it with a first down.
In other key decisions, two coaches faced fourth down calls. They made different calls, and both ended up winning, but let’s talk about Mike Tomlin and Bill Belichick.
Bill Belichick: He went for it at 4th and 1 at midfield at the two minute warning, ahead 23-20. The attempt failed, but Kris Brown missed a 50-yard field goal to tie it, and the Patriots won. I bring this up only because there has been zero discussion on the highlight shows of this call, after the drama of last year where everyone in the mainstream media freaked out and talked about Belichick’s hubris. It just shows that most people judge decisions on results, and not process. The difference here is that the Patriots won.
As for the decision itself, just like last year’s call, I thought it was defensible and pretty much a toss up as to whether you punt or go for it there. The Chargers had 3 timeouts left, and had a pretty good chance of moving the ball if the Patriots punt there, and have plenty of time with the timeouts. A first down, though, doesn’t practically end the game (unlike last year). Brian Burke says slightly in favor of going for it. Though I think he slightly overestimates the chances of conversion there, because the Chargers are going to sell out more to stop a gain while risking a big play, compared to the typical mid-field short yardage situation in the middle of the game, I’ll say that only changes it to a toss up. And we know Belichick is going to be consistent and go for it in these toss up situations.e
Mike Tomlin: Separate from the challenge/fumble on the goal line, Tomlin had a decision after the officials spotted the ball on the 1 foot line. He elected to kick the field goal just before the two minute warning, and take a 23-22 lead. At the time of that decision, Pittsburgh had all three timeouts remaining. I know it worked out because Miami failed to get a field goal to win with 2 minutes left, but I would have gone for it there (as would TBL).
Here’s why. If you have a great defense and three timeouts left, that favors going for it just as much as not. Let’s assume a QB sneak. A touchdown (which would have been likely) puts you up by 5. That’s better than being up 2. If you fail though, and you run the ball before the two minute warning, you have all three timeouts, the two minute timeout, and the opponent pinned on the 1 foot line. We know that coaches are conservative backed against their own goal line, and that would have been even more true here. You have a good chance of getting a safety, which ties it and gets you the ball in good field goal position to win it in regulation. You also have a good chance of getting the ball back in Dolphins territory if they do not pick up a first down, with the chance to have the ball last and win it. The combination of all of those factors means I’m going for it there.
[UPDATE: Brian Burke breaks down the numbers on Tomlin’s decision at Advanced NFL Stats, and says field goal in a close call. It’s not apparent to me if he considered the effect of having all three timeouts on Pittsburgh’s win chances (I’m guessing the average defense trailing there with the opponent pinned has less than all of its timeouts), and he notes the data is thin there]
[photo via Getty]