Mike McCarthy and Kicking from One Yard Away
By Jason Lisk
Much has been made of Mike McCarthy kicking two field goals from the Seattle one-yard line yesterday, so why not jump on? If you have read anything I have written before, you know how I feel about this. It’s not second guessing here. It is a difference in philosophy. Barring unusual circumstances (extreme matchups and injuries, or the time and score remaining), teams should go for it when down right by the goal line early in the game. Not doing so is failing to “take the points” so to speak, and in the long run is a losing strategy.
We can’t actually judge this one on the specific results that followed in this game.
I’m sure if we told McCarthy the ultimate results, he would not be singing a Garth Brooks tune, but might have changed it all about how he approached those plays. Going one for two would have meant a win, even with the Seattle rally, with the late field goal.
Coaches make decisions without perfect information, and don’t know how the rest of the game will play out. It’s also true, though, that McCarthy is not absolved because the Packers ultimately had a 16 point lead, as opposed to allowing Seattle a flurry of 2nd quarter points and then getting to overtime by rallying in the second half.
Again, we must look at process, and take a larger view.
Of course, every action has an impact on what follows. For those that believe in momentum, like Ray Lewis, the decision could affect morale from that point forward. Even if you don’t believe that mass and acceleration are materially impacted by one decision, strategy changes with each thing that happens in a game. Who knows how this one would have played out? How would Morgan Burnett have reacted in a different score situation, for example?
Still, going for it is the better decision, and I base this on facts. Not math. Math just seeks to quantify and is a tool for organizing those facts. FACTS. Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. We have actual results from real NFL games with real people, and a history of prior decisions, and can actually see how those decisions worked in the aggregate as one small butterfly flap in the larger game.
So I went back over the last decade and found every fourth down from the opponent’s 1 yard line, that happened in the first half of a tie ball game (as Green Bay faced with the first decision and the ball inside the one foot line).
Teams that went for it and converted, to take a touchdown lead, ultimately went 19-5 in those games.
Teams that went for it and failed, to remain tied and leave the opponent usually backed up inside the 1 yard line, went 15-5.
Teams that kicked the field goal (all of them made), to take a three point lead and then kickoff, went 13-14.
Overall, teams that decided to go for it won 77% of the games. Teams that opted to take the three points won 48%, before yesterday. You can now make it 13-15. And yes, teams were not the wilting flowers that coaches apparently believe, because teams that remained tied actually won more than teams that took the three points. All of those FACTS are contained in the links here if you want to check those games.
It just so happened that the decision to settle for points on the doorstep twice came back to be a factor yesterday. Not the only factor mind you-there were plenty of things to which we could point. But a factor nonetheless. And unlike a ball bouncing off a face mask, or slipping through a hand, it’s one of the few factors over which a coach has direct control.