Let’s start with the highest profile one from last night, which took place at the end of the first half. With time running out, Dallas ran one more play – a Tony Romo swing pass to Tashard Choice, who fumbled. With no time remaining, Deangelo Hall picked it up and ran it back for a touchdown, Washington’s only one of the game.  I’m usually all for teams being more aggressive than they generally are. But on your own side of the field, with time left for only one play and no chance of getting out of bounds in time to try a field goal – even if you get a big gain – the positives from actually running a play there were way lower than the negatives.

It’s easy to second guess based on the result, but if I’m the coach, my rule is to take a knee unless my quarterback can get it to the end zone in the air.

Chan Gailey, Buffalo

Far fewer people were likely paying attention to the end of the Buffalo-Miami game, but after saying that I thought the change from Jauron to Gailey would be a positive, how am I rewarded? Gailey engaged in some really bizarre decision making at the end of the game. Listen, I know that watching Trent Edwards quarterback your team can lead you to lose your mind a bit. Still, well . . .  let me set the scenario. At the two-minute warning, the Dolphins punted the ball and it was downed at the 1. The score was Miami 13, Buffalo 10. Buffalo had two timeouts remaining – by the way, they had two and not three because Edwards took a timeout on 3rd and 29 to avoid a delay of game in the third quarter.

Let’s just go ahead and make a blanket rule – if it’s 3rd and 29, and the play clock is about to expire, don’t call timeout. Whatever infinitely small increase in your chance of picking up the first down you get from calling timeout there is not worth the loss of the timeout. I digress, though. So Buffalo has it with 1:48 left, and Edwards throws three straight incompletions on some truly bad passes. So Buffalo is facing 4th and 10 from its own 1, with 1:33 left and two timeouts.  Not really a load of good options there, but some are better than others. Gailey sent out the punt team, and the announcer (I think it was Tasker) was questioning it. You know it’s bad when an NFL announcer is questioning it. You can’t punt there, without all your timeouts, because you get the ball back needing to go at least 50 yards in less than 30 seconds with no timeouts to stop the clock, and that’s the best case scenario (they could just get a first down and end it).

Well, Gailey sent the punter out, but then the snapper sent it through the back of the end zone intentionally.  Ahhhh! Crazy like a fox, I thought, he’s going to onside kick. I think the case for going for it versus taking the safety/onside kick is a close one.  You trade needing a field goal versus needing a touchdown, in exchange for some better field position in the event you recover.  The end of game onside kick recovery rate is less than 20%, but Edwards chances of picking up a first on 4th and 10 was probably also.  So, I’m congratulating Gailey for that decision.

Then he sends out the punter for the free kick after the safety.  I can’t even begin to break down how dense this decision was.  He would have been better punting it from the 1 than taking a safety if the goal was to still punt, because if trailing by three from inside your 20 is impossible with 30 seconds and no timeouts, trailing by five from inside your 20 in the same situation is doubly impossible.  An onside kick would have had about a 16% chance of success, and then the Bills would have had a fighting chance thereafter.  The decisions Gailey made basically eliminated what little chance remained.

Mike Smith, Atlanta

Finally, I’m going to go with one that many might disagree with, but the numbers won’t.  In this case, the “numbers” equal “what has really happened in the past.” Mike Smith of Atlanta faced a short 4th and 1 from Pittsburgh 5, trailing 9-6, with 3:28 left.  Roddy White caught a pass that was just short of the first down, and Mike Tomlin even wanted to challenge the spot, but was told he couldn’t because it did not result in a first down (he likely wanted to challenge because he feared Atlanta going for it).  Now, Smith’s decision would count as conventional wisdom–you take the tie there.  Problem is, it’s really a horrible decision when we look at the averages of what happens in these situations.  Here’s why.  First, you have a chance to take control of the game here.  For those of you who play poker, you know you have to get your money in when you think you have the best hand, well, this is a good poker hand here.  You convert, and you either score a TD on that play, or have first and goal.

A touchdown for Atlanta then puts Pittsburgh in a spot where Dennis Dixon needs to go the length of the field for a touchdown, a situation where I think Atlanta is a huge favorite.  To put it simply, a touchdown is a game changer here; a field goal is not.  In fact, Smith was an underdog to win after he kicked a field goal to tie.  To go back to the poker analogy, a missed conversion is not the end of the world; you still have multiple outs.  Pittsburgh would have been against their own goal, with a backup QB and a slight lead.  They would have played it conservatively, and Atlanta would have a good chance to get it back (since it had all three timeouts) with sufficient timeouts and very good field position.  Fortes fortuna adiuvat.